Citizenship and Identity
among Second Generation South Asians
in Western European Countries

by

Urmila Goel

MA South Asian Area Studies

This dissertation is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of MA South Asian Area Studies of the School of Oriental and African Studies (University of London).

15.09.1998
I undertake that all the material presented for examination is my own work and has not been written for me, in whole or in part, by any other person(s). I also undertake that any quotation or paraphrase from the published or unpublished work of another person has been duly acknowledged in the work which I present for examination.

Urmila Goel
09.01.02
# Table of Contents

Abstract 3  
Acknowledgements 4  
Ich bin Inder, oder? 6  
I am an Indian, am I not? 7  
1. Introduction 8  
2. The Situation in Great Britain 12  
2.1. The Migration of South Asians to Britain 12  
2.2. Nationality Law in Britain 13  
2.3. Excursion: Citizenship Law in India 15  
2.4. Second Generation South Asians in Britain 16  
3. The General Situation in Germany 21  
3.1. The Migration of South Asians to Germany 21  
3.2. Citizenship Laws and Naturalisation Rules in Germany 22  
3.3. Legal Implications of Being a Foreigner in Germany 24  
3.4. Second Generation Migrants in Germany 26  
4. Second Generation South Asians in Germany 29  
4.1. Introduction 29  
4.2. The Interviews 30  
4.3. Identity and Citizenship among Second Generation South Asians with two South Asian Parents 31  
4.4. Identity and Citizenship among Second Generation South Asians with one South Asian Parent 36  
4.5. Conclusions 40  
5. Conclusions 43  
Bibliography 49
Abstract
An ever growing part of the ethnic minority communities in Western European countries consist of second and third generation migrants. Having their roots abroad but living their life in the country of residence questions arise about where they belong and as what they see themselves. The official sign of belonging is the citizenship of a state, which is acquired at birth on the basis of either *ius soli* or *ius sanguinis*. This dissertation analyses, using the cases of Britain and Germany, what influence these different concepts have on the identity formation of second generation South Asians. While in both countries the members of the second generation find their own way in the country they live in and look to South Asia for determinants of their identity, in Germany with the more exclusionary citizenship laws, in contrast to Britain, the passport develops into a symbol of (not) belonging. Citizenship of the host country seems thus to be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for developing a sense of belonging.
Acknowledgements

I would like to thank all Indo-Germans who gave me an interview. These were:

Vikrant Agarwal, Frankfurt/Main
Nadda Ammar, Frankfurt/Main
Diptesh Banerjee, Ratingen
Gitanjali Bose, Niederkassel-Rheidt
   Betty Cherian, Köln
   Bobby Cherian, Köln
Shreyas Dave, Hamburg
   Emily Dey, Hamburg
Hilda Fernandez, Walluf
Vincenz Fernandez, Walluf
Ronald Fonseca, Koblenz
   Hetal Gajjar, Karlsruhe
   Samir Gajjar, Karlsruhe
   Asvin Goel, Göttingen
Sanjay Gohil, Karlsruhe
   Susanne Guha, Remscheid
   Manubendra Gupta, Essen
Vinod Jadhav, Dreieich
   Elizabeth Johney Chithilappilly, Jena
   Bijo Johney Chithilappilly, Karlsbad
   Asha Joseph, Witten
   Boncy Kalethumuniyil, Eitorf
   Anita Kanappilly, Bochum
   Antony Kanappilly, Magdeburg
   Attiya Khan, Berlin
   Romin Khan, Berlin
   Shoaib Khan, Frankfurt/Main
   Bindu Kollath, Neuss
   Jasmin Kunchiwala, Karlsruhe
   Marion Kunchiwala, Karlsruhe
   Farida Kutar, Heidelberg
   Binod Mahanty, Genf
   Gita Mahanty-Haase, Karlsruhe
   Diana Manamayil, Schwelm
   Magis Mandapathil, Senden-Bössensell
   Maneesh Mandapathil, Senden-Bössensell
   Nisha Manjooran, Gütersloh
   Shibu Mathew, Ahlen
   Hans Menski, Leicester
   Martin Menski, Leicester
   Deven Misra, Lachendorf
   Robin Mitra, Berlin
   Suma Mundackatharappel, Maintal
   Jincy Nedunthuruthumylail, Bochum
   Robin Pal, Göttingen
   Latha Paruthiyil, Frankfurt/Main
   Kiran Patel, Berlin
   Martin Patel, Karlsruhe
   Claudius Pflug, Freiburg im Breisgau
   Sandra Pflug, Heidelberg
   Suma Plamootil, Witten
   Nisa Punnamparambil, Remagen-Oberwinter
   Asok Punnamparambil, Unkel-Scheuren
Furthermore I would like to thank

Ranji Devadason, Nottingham
Priya Devadason, London
Andrea Parosanu, Greifswald
Michaela Parosanu, Stuttgart
Chiara Salabè, London

for also providing me with interviews on their bi-cultural identities as a comparison with the others.

Finally, I want to thank all those who supported me in my research, in particular my supervisor Dr. Werner Menski.
Ich bin Inder, oder?


Es ist nicht so, daß ich Indien nicht leiden kann, dies ist nämlich überhaupt nicht der Fall. Ich hätte nur gerne irgend etwas, worauf ich als Inder in Deutschland stolz sein kann und damit meine ich nicht Indiens Selbsternennung zum Atom-Staat. Ich persönlich wäre schon froh, wenn Indien international zum Beispiel im Sport besser oder überhaupt vertreten wäre. Vielleicht ist das eine etwas banale Art, den Bezug zu seinem Land herzustellen, aber immerhin ein Anfang. Dieser Konflikt zwischen indisch und deutsch ergibt sich auch bei der Frage, ob ich die deutsche Staatsangehörigkeit beantragen soll und somit den Verlust meiner offiziellen indischen Identität in Kauf nehme.


Bobby Cherian, Bad Boll 1998
I am an Indian, am I not?

I mean when I look into the mirror, I see brown skin and black hair. I can speak Indian, even though not particularly well. My parents come from India, but I was born in Germany. I regularly go to the Indian Mass, although I do not understand much of it. For everyone who sees me, I am the Indian. Myself, I see this somewhat differently. I go to a mixed school. My friends are Germans, Poles, Turks, Croats and Bulgars, both boys and girls. In my free time I waste my time in front of the tele, cycle or go inline skating. Okay, this is not necessarily typically German, but it is also not characteristic for the leisure time activities of Indian juveniles. I basically join in anything stupid that is happening. As a matter of fact one thus has to ask oneself, what makes me feel Indian after all. Good Question, I do not know the precise answer either. On the one hand naturally my appearance is responsible for my not feeling like an average German. On the other hand once in a while I get to hear from my parents that I am an Indian and not a German and that I should thus adjust my lifestyle a bit to that of my compatriots. Why I should do so, I do not really know, especially since I see my relatives only every other year. Nonetheless I have to say that I do not find the German way of living that tempting that I immediately want to become a German.

It is not, that I do not like India, that is not at all the case. I just would like to have something, about which I as an Indian in Germany could be proud and I do not mean India’s self-declaration as a nuclear state. I personally would already be happy, if India was better or at least in some way represented internationally in sports. Maybe this is a banal way of establishing a relationship to one’s own country, but it would at least be a beginning. This conflict between Indian and German also surfaces in the question about whether I should apply for German citizenship and thus put up with the loss of my official Indian identity.

The whole thing is pretty complicated, if one takes the time to think about it. And I think I have no other choice but to let life take its course and to hope that it will end in as favourable as possible a reconciliation or better union of the two cultures with which many/all „Indo-Germans“ live.

Bobby Cherian, Bad Boll 1998
(translation by Urmila Goel)
1. Introduction

The 50s and 60s were the prime time of labour migration to Western Europe. In the post-war booms the economies needed workers and the countries were thus willing to let migrants enter.\(^1\) Today the situation has changed with governments developing ever more sophisticated measures to keep immigrants out. Nonetheless the size of the ethnic minorities in Western European countries is growing, not so much by further entry from abroad but rather by birth. The labour migrants have settled down permanently in their host countries and the second and third generation is growing up. This poses quite new questions not only to their parents but also to the host societies, politicians and researchers. There is a growing realisation today that those members of the ethnic minorities who have been brought up in the host countries have quite different relationships, compared to their parents, both to the countries of origin and of residence; the feeling of belonging has for them another dimension. This issue is not only of interest to themselves, but must also be of interest to the country of residence as the second and following generations are there to stay.

The official sign of belonging to a country is citizenship. Being the citizen of a state means being part of it, sharing in rights and obligations and being able to participate in the formation and running of public institutions. In order to analyse the feeling of belonging of the second generation migrants towards their country of residence, it is thus a first step to look at the manner in which citizenship influences their identity. Given the diversity of citizenship regulations and the characteristics of ethnic minorities it is impossible to tackle this question in a purely abstract and general way. A more

\(^1\) See, for example, Mehrländer (1994) for a discussion of the situation in Germany.
rewarding approach is to look at two case studies which differ in the granting of citizenship to ethnic minorities and to attempt from this the formulation of tentative conclusions about the effect of citizenship on identity formation among second generation migrants.

The two ideal types of citizenship acquisition at birth are either *ius sanguinis*, i.e. acquisition on the basis of descent, or *ius soli*, i.e. acquisition on the basis of place of birth. Nowhere do these ideal types exist in all their purity, one can, however, find countries which adhere to them quite closely. In Western Europe Great Britain’s laws are based on the principle of *ius soli*, while those of Germany are based on *ius sanguinis*. As both countries have, furthermore, experienced considerable labour migration in the post-war era and thus now have to deal with similar phenomena as a consequence, this dissertation will focus on the situation in these two states. If one wanted to look at the major ethnic minority communities these would be the South Asians in Britain and the Turks in Germany. Comparing, however, not only two different countries of residence but also two different areas of origin will complicate the picture unnecessarily and will make it nearly impossible to separate cultural and legal factors. Accordingly the communities analysed in this dissertation will be the South Asians\(^2\) in both Germany and Britain, although these exhibit rather different migration histories and degrees of social integration, as will be seen later.

As in Great Britain most of the second generation South Asians are born into British citizenship, citizenship is not much of a topic in that country and the most pressing

\(^2\) With an emphasis on the Indians in order to be able to refer to only one set of laws in the country of origin.
questions centre on other aspects of identity and feeling of belonging. On these there is some literature, on which the analysis of this dissertation will be based. In Germany, on the other hand, citizenship has become recently a major issue, not only in public debates. Nonetheless, the German literature like the British focuses primarily on other factors determining identities, furthermore it deals mainly with second generation Turks and other Gastarbeiter (guest workers). It was thus not possible to found this work solely on literature analysis. More basic research was needed, thus for a sensible comparison more space had to be allocated to the description of the German than the British situation, and original fieldwork research had to be conducted to throw light on the situation of Indo-Germans.

The comparison of the situation of second generation South Asians in Germany and Britain highlights the different importance citizenship acquires in both countries. It shows how growing up with a foreign citizenship and thus being defined as foreigner by the state and its institutions has an impact on the self-definition. Thus the symbolic links to the country of origin of the parents are strengthened and the second generation foreigners distance themselves from their country of residence, which can result finally in an alienation from the state. This does not imply that all is well where ius soli guarantees automatic acquisition of the citizenship of the place of residence, but shows that ius sanguinis unnecessarily complicates matters further.

Chapter 2 develops the British context, briefly describing the post-war migration history of South Asians to the Isles, the British citizenship law (as well as in a brief excursion the Indian rules) and then analysing the relevant literature on second generation South Asians in Britain.
Chapter 3 sets the scene for Germany, providing also a brief post-war migration history of South Asians, an overview of the citizenship law and rules on naturalisation, a description of the legal impact of being a foreigner in Germany and finally a brief look into the general literature on second generation migrants in Germany.

Chapter 4 is dedicated to the detailed analysis of second generation South Asians in Germany. It bases on the extensive fieldwork conducted in the preparation of this dissertation. After describing how the material was acquired through interviews, the material will be presented and analysed by distinguishing in a first step between second generation members with two and those with only one South Asian parent. In a second step the general features discovered by the fieldwork will be discussed.

Chapter 5 establishes the general conclusions to the topic by comparing the British and German situations. The discussion will centre on the interaction of external and internal definition in the formation of identity and belonging, and the role citizenship plays in this. Furthermore, it will be analysed how a foreign citizenship influences the relationship of second generation South Asians towards the state in which they live. From this questions for future research will develop.
2. The Situation in Great Britain

2.1. The Migration of South Asians to Britain

As usual in the 50s and 60s labour migrations the first South Asian migrants to Britain were young single men, some with family in their country of origin, who came to work for some time and then return to South Asia. A rotation system developed with one family member always being in Britain to earn money for the family at home. But with the restriction of entry regulations by the British authorities from the 60s onwards this set-up could not work any more, the family members already on the Isles had to stay in order to keep that source of income. The sojourners gradually transformed to settlers, established themselves more in Britain and now wanted to have their families there. Thus most of them either got their wives and children in South Asia to join them or married in their country of origin and brought their wives with them to Britain. Accordingly from the 60s onwards a second generation of South Asians is present on the Isles and now already the members of the third, even fourth generation are growing up. They form a major part of the roughly one and a half million or 3% South Asians in Britain’s population today.

The South Asians in Britain come mainly from Punjab, Gujarat and the Sylhet region, many with a detour via East Africa; most are Hindus, Sikhs or Muslims. Due to chain migration the settlement pattern shows certain centres such as Greater London, Leicester, Birmingham and Bradford. The typical migrant lives within a community and had to enter the labour market as unskilled or semi-skilled worker, many have

---

3 There is an extensive literature on this topic. A good concise overview can be found in Ballard (1994b), on which much of the following is based.
established themselves as small entrepreneurs, mainly as shopkeepers. Professional and highly skilled South Asian migrants are relatively few in Britain and they are living much more dispersed than the others. While most migrants aim for educational improvement for their children, still many members of the second generation enter - for various reasons - the labour market in the lower segment. Most stay within the ethnic community of their parents, accepting the continuity of traditions like arranged marriages for themselves.

2.2. Nationality Law in Britain

Laws do not emerge out of a vacuum, they are the result of historical and political processes and this must be particularly true for a central issue such as citizenship law. The legal regulations can, in fact, not be considered independent of what can been called the national identity. The latter, while fuzzy in nature (Cohen 1995, 59), is shaped in Britain by at least three core aspects, which are Protestantism\(^5\), the union of several kingdoms\(^6\) and the Empire\(^7\). The multiplicity of nations in the United Kingdom has meant that rather than Great Britain establishing itself as an ethnic nation state, it had to conceive itself as a civic nation (Bryant 1997, 166). Furthermore, because of its colonial interests, it had to include as subjects to the Crown also the population of the colonies and after their independence had a responsibility to these places and their people which influenced also legislation (Favell 1997, 187). Nonetheless, the basis of

\(^4\) See Ballard (1994b, 7) for the exact figures according to the Census Report in 1991.
\(^5\) See Miller (1995) for a discussion of the influence of Protestantism on the British national identity.
\(^6\) See Bryant (1997, 166-167) on what impact the nature of Britain as a union of several nations (English, Scots, Welsh and Irish) has had on British national identity.
\(^7\) Miller (1995, 158-159) comments also on the impact of the Empire on British national identity.
the state remains in Protestantism and Western European philosophy. Accordingly there are also ethnoreligious undertones in the conception of the British nation, particularly so as national identity receives its power from aspects which go beyond the purely civic (Jacobson 1997, 190). Both these forces one can see at work in the shaping of the modern British nationality laws. The law gradually developed from an inclusive, colonial model, where there was no doubt that anybody born in the Empire owed allegiance to the Crown, to a system where special status was given to those of British ethnic descent (57, 61). In the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act 1914 the dominant principle was still ius soli (63), but already the British Nationality Act 1948 introduced parts of ius sanguinis (64) and in the British Nationality Act 1981 the principle of ius soli was considerably weakened. Since the 01.01.1983, birth in the UK guarantees British citizenship only if either parent is a British citizen or is settled in the country (85-86). As for most births in Britain the requirements will be met for practical concerns the ius soli rule is still in force and for historical reasons citizenship has to be granted on a non-racial basis (Cohen 1995, 59). The theoretical deviation from the principle is, however, noteworthy as it reflects the attempt of the law maker to be restrictive in conceding British citizenship, in spite of Bryant (1997, 169) arguing that in general the contentious issue about migrants is not their civic rights but rather whether they will be granted entry to the Britain in the first place.

It is important for the following analysis that basically all the children of South Asian labour migrants who were born in Britain automatically acquired British citizenship and

---

8 A concise overview of the development of British nationality law can be found in Shah (1995), on which much of the following discussion is based - references to this work will be indicated by page number only. A comprehensive treatment for all the details has been provided by Fransman (1989) and Dummett and Nicol (1990) discuss different aspects of the history and nature of the nationality law.
were thus endowed with the same rights and obligations as their white neighbours. Only those members of the second generation who were born in South Asia itself thus experienced the legal status of a foreigner in Britain and had to consider whether they should apply for naturalisation or not.

**2.3. Excursion: Citizenship Law in India**

Any Indian acquiring voluntarily the citizenship of another country loses the Indian citizenship according to Article 9 of the *Constitution* of India. Thus, even though a country like Britain would accept dual nationality, for Indians this is no option as India forces its citizens to choose between one or the other citizenship.\(^9\) Thus while theoretically all children of Indian fathers, and since a change in law in 1992 also those of Indian mothers\(^10\), acquire according to Article 4 of the *Citizenship Act* 1955 the parent’s nationality by descent, few will actually claim it when born in Britain, as opting for the citizenship of the country of residence will be of more practical advantage. It seems, however, that for minors there would actually be the possibility of a dual nationality. Pandey (1988, 107) was informed by the Indian Embassy in Germany that this was accepted until the reaching of majority, at which time Indian citizenship would be lost if there was no explicit decision for keeping it and renouncing the other. The question of dual nationality might in future be of less importance as there are plans

---


\(^10\) As Pandey (1988, 107) writes, before that time children of Indian mothers could acquire Indian citizenship only after application. This refers to Article 5, para b or d of the Indian *Citizenship Act*, 1955.
for the introduction of a special status for Persons of Indian Origin which would grant similar rights as Indian citizenship.\textsuperscript{11}

\textbf{2.4. Second Generation South Asians in Britain}

At least since the 70s, not only the migrants themselves but also their children have been in the focus of research in Britain. This interest was initially triggered by concern for the culture conflict which the second generation was supposed to be exposed to. Accordingly, research has since been occupied with either proving or disproving this hypothesis, concentrating on social and cultural factors of identity formation (see in particular Watson 1977). Only recently has there been an extension of the field of research also towards legal and institutional aspects, thus the question of citizenship is hardly ever mentioned in the early texts. It is thus not necessary, in view of the topic of this dissertation, to provide a comprehensive analysis of all the literature on second generation South Asians, it is sufficient to present some core texts and their ideas.

An early study dealing with the national identity of second generation South Asians is Thompson (1974), which asks whether his respondents in Coventry were Punjabis or English. He distinguishes between the majority of the young men, who stay within the Punjabi traditions and solely want to liberalise them somewhat and the minority, who become individual rebels, anglicise and vanish from the community. It is argued that the latter have generally experienced some break down in their socialisation, while the former exhibit

\textsuperscript{11} A member of the Indian Embassy in Germany informed second generation South Asians of this at a seminar in 1995 (Evangelische Akademie Bad Boll 1996, 1-2). This has also been recently a topic in the media, see for example Rekhi and Merchant (1998, 24b).
Thompson seems to be guided in his analysis by the wish to go against the assimilationist pressures put on the second generation by people like Enoch Powell. He thus emphasises the retention of culture more than the creation of an own way of living, which is acknowledged only in passing. Interesting for the analysis of the topic of this dissertation is that basically all of Thompson’s respondents were born in India and would thus not only know that country themselves but also had Indian citizenship at the time of his fieldwork. A similar conjecture must be true for Taylor (1976), whose respondents were also primarily born in South Asia. Asked why they would like to stay in England or return to South Asia, a high proportion said either that they preferred England or felt that they belonged to their country of origin. Furthermore, many were thinking about leaving Britain because of fear of racism (Taylor 1976, 194-196). Taylor (1976, 203-206) concludes from this a feeling of not belonging which has its origin largely in the ‘othering’ by whites on the basis of skin colour. A strong identification with the country of origin and a sense of belonging there rather than to England seems to be a reaction to this exclusion, as it makes it possible to be not as much hurt by the hostility met in their country of residence (Taylor 1976, 207 and 210). South Asianness is not rejected, the respondents perceive themselves as Asian rather than English (Taylor 1976, 211-212), assimilation is restricted to economic and civic matters, to a small degree also to cultural and structural aspects, and does not enter the spheres of marriage, identity, attitude and behaviour (Taylor 1976, 225). This shows that while establishing themselves firmly in England, these second generation South Asians preserve distinctive features of their parents’ cultures. Based on a much smaller sample,
Brah (1978) reaches similar conclusions, arguing that the pride in their ethnicity shown by second generation South Asians in Southall and the preserving of their Indianness in Britain is a reaction to the dilemma of being, on the one hand, critical of the parents’ culture and, on the other hand, experiencing the devaluation of the own traditions by the white environment.

The studies in the 90s explicitly emphasise a now well-recognised phenomenon which was there already ‘between the lines’ in the early works, i.e. that the home of the second generation South Asians is Britain, but that they will not fully assimilate, instead shaping their life on their own terms participating in both worlds and thus creating a distinctive ethnicity. Ballard (1994b, 31-33) speaks in this context of ‘skilled cultural navigation’, acknowledging that due to the pressures put on the second generation both by the parents and the environment, this can also result in rebellion against what is supposed to be the ‘done thing’.

Gardner and Shukur (1994) describe, like many others, how the external categorisation via skin colour results in a feeling of otherness and is crucial for the self-definition as Bengali. The romantic image of the country of origin, which is consequently created, is however destroyed once the young South Asian visits it and experiences the own otherness in the mythical ‘home’. Thus the second generation members realise that their home is in the UK, and the Bengali-ness in Britain rather than the link to Bangladesh is emphasised - ethnicity accordingly becomes context-dependent. According to Vertovec (1994) second generation Indo-Caribbeans even more lack a link to a geographical

---

12 See especially the articles in Ballard (1994a) and also Drury (1991). A few interviews conducted by me led to basically the same results.
home outside Britain and more than other groups define themselves on the basis of their otherness in their country of residence rather than with reference to some mythical other home.

The most recent study by Jacobson (1997) supplies besides her empirical work about the feeling of Britishness among second generation Pakistanis also a theoretical framework, in which she analyses her fieldwork material. She establishes three boundaries of Britishness - the civic (formal, official, citizenship), the racial (ancestry, blood) and the cultural (values, attitudes, lifestyle), and describes how these three interact to establish feelings of belonging and otherness. All her respondents have the British citizenship, thus fall within the civic boundary. This, however, does seem to have only limited impact on the feeling of Britishness, it is seen by most as purely functional and as a source of security of residence in Britain. The value of the official civic belonging is questioned by most of the respondents as they constantly experience that they are racially excluded, a fact which they find unfair and which is deeply felt by them shaping their identity as an other. The racial seems in fact to be the most exclusionary boundary, as the cultural is seen by some respondents also as inclusive given that they share similar lifestyles and attitudes with white British persons.

Concluding, Jacobson (1997, 196) asks for a redefinition of what British means, arguing that a constitutional reform could lead to a more meaningful citizenship (see also Spencer 1995).

Studies about other groups of second generation migrants emphasise the importance of racial criteria in the process of othering. Ullah (1985), while arguing that the second generation Irish experience the same problems as other second generation members, also acknowledges their option to fully assimilate with the English and thus virtually
disappear. Song (1997) in contrast to this argues that all attempts of assimilation by second generation Chinese seem to promise little success as the different looks make an opting out of one’s ethnicity basically impossible.

The dominance of racial exclusion in the identity formation of second generation South Asians in Britain does, however, not imply that the civic exclusion, where it is experienced, is of no importance. Interviews I conducted with two sisters with Indian parents, where the younger one was born in Britain and accordingly British citizen by birth while the older, being born in India, was naturalised only as an adult, showed that citizenship can have a major impact on identity also in Britain. While for the younger sister citizenship was not much of a topic, although still a sign of belonging to the country, the older one had always suffered from only having the Indian passport. Not only was travelling more difficult, she also felt that having a different citizenship made a difference to other people; only after naturalisation did she feel the right to say that she was British, something she had always envied her younger sister for. For her the change of nationality was of major importance, even though in general Cross (1997, i), probably quite rightly, argues that the acquisition of British citizenship by members of ethnic minorities has had only minimal effects on their position in British society.
3. The General Situation in Germany

3.1. The Migration of South Asians to Germany\(^{13}\)

The 50s and 60s, although a time of state-led recruitment of workers abroad have seen only few South Asians coming to Germany. Initially a few thousand young men, mainly from Bengal but also from other parts of India and Pakistan, came on their own initiative in order to find jobs or to study. They picked Germany because of its economic power, its good education facilities, its traditionally good relations with India and the fact that it was not a colonial power. Most of the young men who stayed in Germany for some time did not long remain in unskilled employments. Most aimed for higher educational qualifications and ended up in the upper sector of the labour market. Given that they had come individually, there were no well-developed South Asian communities in Germany and there was little regional separatism. The South Asians lived dispersed over the whole country and had much contact with Germans. Many of the migrants married German wives, some married in their countries of origin and brought their wives to Germany. Today as they are reaching their retirement age, most of their children are at universities, some have already founded families and establish themselves, like their parents, in the German middle class.

Some time after this first phase of migrants from South Asia, a second phase, quite different in nature, developed. In the late 60s and 70s, thousands of young Christian women from Kerala were recruited by hospitals as trainee or qualified nurses in order to keep the health system working. As these migrants came in groups and were cared for

\(^{13}\) There is not much literature on South Asians in Germany. The best sources for the post-war migration history are Desai (1993), Punnamparambil (1995) and Schmalz-Jacobson and Hansen (1997). Together with knowledge from many interviews these have informed the following section.
by German institutions, soon a Malayali community developed catering for occupational, social and religious needs of the young women. After some years in Germany most had an arranged marriage in India or married one of the Malayali men who had migrated to Germany, thus establishing Malayali families in their host country and developing their community further. Most of the children are still in school, some are already at universities or in an apprenticeship, only a few have already established their own families. In contrast to the other second generation South Asians in Germany most young Malayalis have grown up in an Indian community, with their own societies and clubs, going to Indian Masses and special Malayali schools. Their parents are eager that their children will enter a higher professional status than themselves, displaying a strong preference for a career in medicine.

There are also other groups of South Asians in Germany, especially Sikh asylum seekers from Punjab, Ahmadi asylum seekers from Pakistan and Tamil asylum seekers from Sri Lanka. They all came from the 70s onwards and thus have younger family structures, with the members of the second generation still being rather small. Furthermore their life in Germany is strongly determined by their legal status as asylum seekers, making an analysis of their attitudes and identities a topic for itself. The following analysis will thus concentrate on what Desai (1993) calls the established South Asians, as described above.

3.2. Citizenship Laws and Naturalisation Rules in Germany

The literature on Germany’s national identity comes to a conclusion quite different from that on Britain, emphasising that the basis of the German state is the idea of an ethnic
nation and that this notion also informs the *ius sanguinis* of the citizenship law.\textsuperscript{14} Parekh (1995, 262) and Kurthen (1995), however, show that this notion of national homogeneity is only a self-deception which results in many incompatibilities. There are, for example, inconsistencies between a liberal asylum law and an ethnic conception of citizenship, as well as between the ideal of individual freedom and the notion of cultural homogeneity. In either case the *ius sanguinis* which links the acquisition of German citizenship not to residence in the country but to descent of German blood, forms a major exclusionary mechanism for ethnic minorities and the absurdity of even third generation migrants having the status of foreigner in their country of birth and residence. Until 1975, furthermore, the *ius sanguinis* was applicable only via the father, with the result that children of mixed parentage where the mother was German (this was the standard situation for the families of the early South Asian migrants to Germany) were born as foreigners. Since 1975 this differentiation according to the gender of the German parent is no longer valid and all children of mixed parentage acquire German citizenship by birth. For all those who were born before 1975 their parents could declare within a deadline that their children should get the German citizenship as well. Those who missed this period had to go through the regular process of naturalisation. On the German side, nobody makes sure that those who grow up with dual nationality renounce the other when reaching majority. Accordingly, if the Indian regulations were not so strict, second generation South Asians with a German parent could have retained dual nationality all their life.

---

\textsuperscript{14} See, for example, Bryant (1997, 161-162), Brubaker (1996, 169) and Wilpert (1993, 71).
For all those second generation migrants born in Germany with two foreign parents the only way of acquiring German citizenship is by naturalisation. Until 1990 the basis for this was only the *Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz* of 1913 which left much discretion to the authorities. Since a change in the *Ausländergesetz* (AuslG), the process has become easier and under certain conditions one has a right to naturalisation. According to § 85 AuslG anybody between the ages of 16 and 23 years, who has lived eight years in Germany, went six years to a school in Germany, has not been prosecuted for any criminal offence and will renounce his former citizenship can acquire German citizenship. After that age according to § 86 AuslG one has to have lived 15 years in Germany, be without prosecution for a criminal offence, be able to provide for one’s own living expenses and renounce the former citizenship in order to become officially a German. As long as one does not get into conflict with the law, adheres to the deadlines and stays not for a long period outside Germany it is thus only a matter of bureaucracy to change one’s citizenship.

### 3.3. Legal Implications of Being a Foreigner in Germany

Living as a foreigner in Germany, no matter whether one was born there or has recently migrated, has many legal implications. Igstadt (1998) has collected the major implications for second generation foreigners as they result from the *Ausländergesetz*, which deal mainly with the right to stay in Germany, the rights to bring foreign relatives to Germany and the possibility for the state to deport the foreigner. For members of the second generation the rules are more liberal and directed toward permanent residence than those for their parents and for sojourners, still they fall by far short of the civic rights linked to German citizenship, such as the right of political participation. The major aspect is that the right to permanent settlement is never fully given and that many
formalities have to be performed. On top of these restrictions on second generation migrants in Germany, other legal disadvantages are linked to the status as foreigner. Not only is travelling into countries which have not signed the Schengen agreement much more complicated, also small everyday routines are more time-consuming or troublesome. Thus, for example, the obligation to carry identification papers can only be fulfilled by always carrying the foreign passport and thus permanently risking its loss.\(^{15}\) Furthermore, foreigners need to get an official document which is only valid for a short period to prove their address, while Germans can use their identity card for this. When marrying, the authorities will demand a confirmation of the country of origin that the person is not already married. Since India does not provide such documents, applicants either end up illegally buying the necessary certificates in India or facing a long legal process in Germany\(^{16}\). Finally, unknown to most of the second generation South Asians with non-German citizenship the regulations of international private law mean that many matters of family law, such as rules of inheritance, are guided by the laws of the countries of their parents’ origin rather than by those of their home.

This far from complete account illustrates the enormity of implications the legal status of foreigner in Germany has. In general the consequences are at least troublesome, the only potentially positive exception being the exemption from obligatory military service for young men.

\(^{15}\) For German citizens this is less a problem as they are provided with a small identity card, which they can easily carry.

\(^{16}\) See Punnamparambil (1998) for a description of such a case.
3.4. Second Generation Migrants in Germany

In Germany, as in Britain, one can find literature on second generation migrants, in particular focusing on the largest group, the Turks. Like the British these studies used to centre around the notion of culture conflict, but increasingly legal aspects are taken into account as well. Already Auernheimer (1988, 127-128) emphasises the effects the insecure foreigner status has on the identity formation of members of the second generation. Bielefeld (1988, 200-205) argues, similarly to the British researchers, that the young Turks shape their life around their bi-culturality on their own terms, having thus implicitly two citizenships, the official one of the country of origin of their parents and the social one of their specific situation. Providing them with an equal legal status as other German residents would, in Bielefeld’s view, be a necessary but not sufficient condition for integration. The ambivalence in status, i.e. belonging officially to another country while actually living in and feeling part of Germany, is also taken up by a report of the federal commissioner for the matters of foreigners, which argues that this collision of self and external perception can impair the self-confidence and that the best solution would be to provide second generation migrants with German citizenship. Gaitanides (1996, 39) highlights that one cannot expect an identification with the German state and society by the second generation migrants if one does not endow them with legal and political rights.

Some authors also study the willingness to naturalise among second generation migrants in Germany. The extensive empirical study of Mehrländer et al. (1996, 412-424) shows that the young foreigners, especially those from outside the European

17 Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für die Belange der Ausländer (1992, 18-19)
Union, are increasingly willing to take the German citizenship and that the parents largely accept it, nonetheless many are still insecure about whether they should actually take the step. The main reasons for applying, are among those who have been long in Germany, the wish for equal legal status and political rights as well as the fact that they perceive themselves to have roots in Germany. Furthermore also the freedom of travel is an incentive. The majority does not consider naturalisation to be a distancing from the country of origin, but most of those who do not want to have the German citizenship argue that they want to keep their national identity. Other motives for staying a foreigner carry much less weight in the responses. In fact changes in Turkish laws which removed legal disadvantages for naturalised Turks in Germany did not result in a significantly higher willingness to naturalise. Practical reasons thus do not seem to be the major reasons for clinging to the original citizenship.

Popp (1996, 59-63) takes a more analytical approach and finds a slightly different interpretation of the willingness to naturalise. She argues that while taking the German citizenship shows the wish to stay forever in Germany, it does not mean that one acquires the German identity and loses the other. The incentives for the application are much more practical and depend very much on the general satisfaction of the second generation migrants. The latter, however, is impaired by experiencing xenophobia, by being socialised by the state to grow up as a foreigner. The insecurity of the status together with the implicit othering results in an alienation from Germany and makes it difficult to renounce the original citizenship for the German, thus the wish for a dual nationality is a logical consequence of the circumstances. Finally, Ehringfeld (1997, 79-83) takes the view that naturalisation stands normally at the end of a process of analysing one’s own identity and signifies a detachment from the country of origin.
Thus most second generation migrants will keep their original citizenship because they do not want to lose their national identity.
4. Second Generation South Asians in Germany

4.1. Introduction

During the past few years, second generation South Asians in Germany, most of them with Indian roots, have started to organise themselves somewhat, help each other in the identity formation process, learn more about the country of origin of their parents and become more visible in Germany. While a concern about their own bi-cultural identity and its consequences probably has always been an issue in private, it comes out into the open in particular at seminars and conferences. One major trigger in the development of activities has been an annual seminar for second generation South Asians which was started in 1994. Following from this, the Indian Embassy organised a meeting for the participants with the ambassador to discuss the issue of dual nationality in October 1994, regional groups have developed, members of the second generation have entered the editorial team of a magazine for dialogue between India and Germany and have acquired positions of functionaries in South Asian societies. Defining their own identity is at least implicitly always one of the issues, another are the alienation by society and the struggles fought with the parents. The latters’ views can have an impact also in alienating the second generation from Germany. In particular so, when a father tells his children, as I witnessed, that they will always be foreigners in the country, thus had better expect to be kicked out, and should plan their life accordingly. In another case a father while conceding that naturalisation is an option for the second generation emphasises that it is a sign for detaching yourself from the country of origin (Mandapathil 1992). Pandey (1988, 251-263) describes a situation in a bi-national
family where both parents use the issue of citizenship for creating allegiance to their respective countries of origin. The children, having been defined by their father as Indian, identified themselves with the Indian citizenship and had thus some problems with losing it.

4.2. The Interviews

Given that there is no research published so far on the situation of second generation South Asians in Germany, the basis for the following analysis are 68 interviews I conducted this summer. Being myself a second generation Indian (with a German mother) in Germany and having been involved in the Indian community my whole life, the interest for the topic arose over the years and I had enough contacts to make extensive interviews. I chose my respondents among friends and acquaintances of myself, among people I met at seminars and among other persons recommended to me by respondents. The main selection criteria were that they came from members of established middle class families, in order to avoid the introduction of social diversity and the necessity to eliminate its influences on identity formation, with at least one South Asian parent and a minimum age of 15 years. I attempted to have a rather diverse sample instead of opting for a random sample, in order to include respondents with one or two South Asian parents, of both genders, with German or non-German citizenship, some with Pakistani roots, and of different ages. Basically all my respondents were either at high school, at university or had left the latter already, a few had opted for an apprenticeship, i.e. all were well educated. The major group missing, due to time

18 See Evangelische Akademie Bad Boll (1996, 1997 and 1998) for more information both about the seminar and the points of view of second generation South Asians in Germany.
restrictions, in the sample are second generation South Asians over 35 years of age, who would have had quite a different legal and socialisation history and could thus have complemented the picture. The interviews were conducted in an open form, giving the respondent his or her own time and way of dealing with certain core questions. All interviews lasted between 10 and 45 minutes and were taped. In order to assess the impact of skin colour I also interviewed a few members of other second generation ethnic minorities without a visible difference to normal Germans.

The following analysis does not claim to provide a representative picture of the attitudes of second generation South Asians in Germany, neither is the rather large sample size of 68 taken as a basis for quantitative analysis. It is believed that the value of the study lies in a qualitative interpretation of the interviews, highlighting interesting common features without implying that all respondents can be nicely put into labelled jars.

4.3. Identity and Citizenship among Second Generation South Asians with two South Asian Parents

Almost two thirds of the respondents had either two Indian or two Pakistani parents. Almost all of them had been born in Germany, in the case of the others the mothers had gone to their countries of origin only for the birth, thus hardly any of the respondents had lived for a considerable time period in South Asia. Interesting for the analysis is the fact that with respect to citizenship a whole spectrum, from those still living with the Indian citizenship to some who were even born with German passport was covered.

---

19 As most of the migrants in the 50s and 60s, who are now well established in the German middle class, came from either of these two countries, I was not able in the limited time available to find respondents with parents from other South Asian countries.

20 All Pakistanis in the sample were already naturalised.
The different time of acquisition of the German citizenship is used below as a classification criterion.

Among those who still have the Indian citizenship, the youngest being 15 and the oldest 28, and having no concrete plans to apply for German citizenship, it is interesting to note that none classified him- or herself simply as Indian. All emphasised that their identity was more complex than that, including also many German parts. They acknowledged that naturalisation would have practical advantages, but these were not seen as a sufficient incentive, in particular as so far it had always been possible to resolve problems also with the foreign citizenship. The major reason for not applying for the German passport was the consequent loss of the Indian one and thus the threat of losing part of one’s identity. This was the feeling also of those who would at other moments emphasise that a passport is only a piece of paper without implications for one’s identity. For many, keeping the Indian citizenship was also a sign of defiance against a Germany which had repeatedly othered them. One of the respondents, much more politically active than most of the others, explicitly mentioned that she would stick to her passport for political reasons both in Germany and India. On the one hand her aim is to make the German authorities notice that there is a problem to tackle and she is willing to bear the consequences of this. On the other hand as she is also politically active in India, she wants to prevent the possibility of the authorities restricting her right of entry to that country. This, however, is possible for her only by keeping the Indian citizenship as as a German citizen she would need to apply for a visa for India. Including her all see the solution to their problems, as they are aware that it is disadvantageous to be a legal foreigner in your country of residence, in the granting of dual nationality. This would make it possible to have the practical advantages of
German citizenship without having to give up the Indian identity, and it would be seen as a signal that the German state is willing to accept second generation migrants as permanent part of the country.

Some of the respondents with Indian citizenship had also concrete plans about naturalisation. A few did not put this into practice so far because they do not see any pressure and inertia prevents them from acting. The others were still struggling because, although they saw the practical advantages of the act, they were also fearing the loss of identity (or in one case want to avoid military service). Thus also for them the option of dual nationality could be the trigger for actually applying for German citizenship. Interestingly one of the respondents gave besides occupational advantages as major reason for his decision to naturalise the human rights situation in India and the greater reliability of German embassies abroad in securing their citizen’s rights and security.

The respondents in the sample, who were naturalised due to their own application, exhibit similar sentiments as the two former groups. They would classify themselves neither just as Indians or just as Germans but rather as something mixed. The incentive for the application was for all a mixture of rational reasoning and a feeling of belonging to Germany, while the degree of mixture was very different among them, with some respondents being at either end of the spectrum. Common to all was a fear of loss linked to renouncing the Indian citizenship, thus also for them the option of dual nationality would have made things easier. One said she would never have applied had she not wanted the protection of the German embassy in India in case her parents fixed an arranged marriage against her will. Interestingly for basically all respondents the acquisition of German citizenship meant also a move towards Germany in the sense of feeling more linked to and involved with the country. One respondent who became
German solely for rational reasons and formerly showed strong anti-German feelings, is now much more aware of her own German parts and the necessity to acknowledge them.

A few respondents were naturalised together with siblings and their mother, it was thus not due to their own incentive that they got the German citizenship. All of them, again, saw themselves best described with a mixed identity. The naturalisation was accepted for practical reasons, but they would have preferred dual nationality rather than giving up their Indian passport. Similar arguments were given by the majority of those who were naturalised together with their whole families at a time when they were at least 12 years old. They primarily saw the whole business as functional, providing practical advantages and being separate from identity issues. They would have liked to have a dual nationality, but it was not particularly important to them. One respondent said he would always be and feel Indian, the German passport was just a measure to gain certain legal advantages. Only two respondents differed from this general response; both felt highly emotional about their naturalisation. One was against it from the beginning, as she did not want to be a German and felt much closer to India, she is even considering to take her Indian citizenship back. The other was very much in favour of the application and is content with her German citizenship. Both said that they had no interest whatsoever in dual nationality as their identity was sufficiently represented with one. The respondent who felt very Indian said that two citizenships would only confuse her.

Among those who were naturalised with their families there were also a few who had both citizenships until the age of 16 or 18. All of them not only found their parents’ decision for naturalisation but also the dual nationality positive. Although they would
have preferred to stick to both, it was, however, not very hard for them to renounce the Indian citizenship once they had reached the age of decision. One respondent was, nonetheless, very dissatisfied with being forced to decide at the age of 16 years, an age he found, where one is not yet interested enough and the parents will decide for one.

For those who were naturalised with their family below the age of ten years, the act as such was no important topic. Most would have welcomed dual nationality, but did not feel deeply about it. They generally had no strong emotions about the issue and saw no problem in defining themselves as something different than German although they had that citizenship. There was only one exception to this attitude: one respondent disliked anything Indian so much that she was happy to be rid of the legal link and saw herself as fully German. This is a rather unusual attitude, which is not even shared by the one respondent who was already born with German citizenship due to her father’s earlier naturalisation. Because of othering by her environment she felt different from other Germans, and out of defiance against their attitudes wanted a dual nationality in order not only to experience the disadvantages of living in a bicultural world. Nonetheless she was quite happy with her German citizenship.

Common to basically all respondents was that they were not able and/or willing to offer a definite self-definition. When pressed most would, however, tend a bit more to their Indian part as their skin colour was perceived as a permanent marker for their otherness in Germany. Arguments for naturalisation were generally functional and practical, emphasising the advantages for travelling, studying and employment. The improved freedom of movement among the members of the Schengen agreement is today seen as one practical reason less to naturalise, in fact some respondents said that had they known about this change in advance, they might not have changed their citizenship.
German citizenship was seen by some, furthermore, as a potential safeguard in case of increased anti-foreigner policies in Germany and others perceived it as a safeguard in India. The German citizenship was in general equated with a sense of security, particularly in Germany. It was also quite apparent that most respondents focused solely on the German situation when speaking to me. This was most clear in the question of dual nationality, where basically all argued against the German government and felt far less strong about the Indian government’s refusal to allow it. This can be seen as an indicator that at the centre of their interest is Germany and the happenings there; about which they feel deeply. South Asia is more a symbol for their identity and their family connection than something real which affects their everyday life. Because of this split between symbol and rationality, dual nationality has so much appeal to most respondents. It would mean that they did not have to choose between mother and father, as one respondent said. Due to the constant struggle between identity and rationality, an application for naturalisation is often put off for a long time. The incentive to do something usually comes through a trigger from outside, such as a change in the law or some person urging them to act. Similarly for young men the perspective of having to do military service or its social alternative seems to be used as a simple reason to put off the disliked decision.

4.4. Identity and Citizenship among Second Generation South Asians with one South Asian Parent

Almost a third of the sample had one German and one South Asian parent. In most cases the fathers were the migrants either from South Asia or East Africa, who had come to Europe (not necessarily Germany, some met their German wives in England) in the 50s and 60s. In the cases where the mother was from India, the migration histories
were quite diverse, one came as a nurse, another as a student, a third had met her husband in India. These differences in the parentage do, however, not seem to have much affect on the children’s identity formation as one cannot find significant differences linked to these. It does not seem to have a major impact whether the mother or the father was of South Asian origin, although the presumption that mothers have more influence on their children’s identity formation seems in general plausible.

Only one of the respondents still had Indian citizenship. He had been born before 1975 in Germany and his parents seem not to have bothered to get the German passport for him when this was possible, although they remained all his life in that country. In the interview he emphasised that he was Indian and that one should never change the citizenship one is born with. He had also no interest in dual nationality. The Indian citizenship, thus, seemed to have had a major impact on his self-definition.

For all the others who had been born before the change of law in 1975 of a South Asian father and had thus not acquired their mother’s citizenship by birth, the parents (in particular the mothers) had immediately seized the opportunity of obtaining German citizenship when this was possible also for them. Knowledge about this act differed much among the respondents. One pair of siblings did not know that they had to be naturalised at the ages of 6 and 9 years, they believed that they were born with dual citizenship. Two others were very much aware of the fact, that almost, had not the law been changed and their parents acted on it, they had grown up with the status of foreigner and that things would have been very different then. Of all these bi-national respondents only one defined herself just as German, all the others qualified this somewhat with more or less reference to South Asia. The one who declared herself as German mentioned also that her parents had always told her that she was not less than
others, that in fact she was more, that she was double. This positive definition by her parents might have made her more self-confident in claiming her Germanness than others, where in some cases bi-culturality was associated by the parents with potential problems. In any case it has to be emphasised that for most respondents their self definitions were not stable in time. In the course of their life they had phases of being more or less close to either part of their identities. The majority of the respondents would welcome dual nationality as it alone would represent their identity, but only one made actually efforts to obtain it. Another had also made some efforts, but as he said purely for practical reasons, not because he felt the Indian citizenship would reflect his identity. Some others did not see any benefit of dual nationality, as they knew who they were without an official confirmation and one respondent was happy to be rid of her Pakistani citizenship as that had been always equated by her mother with danger.

Among those who were born as Germans almost half defined themselves as such, the others were not willing to do so either because they did not see themselves as such or because they argued that the normal Germans would never accept them as such. Even though many thus considered themselves German, all but two would have welcomed dual nationality as this could represent their identity. Of the two who were for theoretical reasons against the introduction of dual nationality, because they believed that one can be loyal only to one country, one would nonetheless have liked to claim dual nationality for himself. The German citizenship meant to some of the group a symbol of identity and belonging, to others it was a functional concept, providing them with a privileged and secure position.

Some of the sample were born not with a South Asian but rather with a form of British citizenship because their fathers were either from East Africa or were naturalised in
Britain. All had very little emotional link to England or East Africa and only a limited feeling of belonging to India. One of them would have liked to have the Indian citizenship in order to have an own link to the country of origin rather than to need to define this via his father. Basically all considered themselves primarily German, but all with qualifications. One said that given the strong mixture of cultural influences his father had experienced, he did not want to define himself at all ethnically. He also had a well-developed interest in political matters and for that reason was happy to have the dual citizenship (British-German) as this could prove a point to the German public.

The responses of two brothers who had grown up in England, one with German, the other with British citizenship, showed that in their case the passports had some influence on their self-definition, although they both emphasised the irrelevance of ‘that bit of paper’. In fact their friends hardly seemed to distinguish between them on the basis of their citizenship, accordingly the external definition in the immediate environment was not particularly shaped by the passport. Most important for themselves was in any case that they were of mixed parentage and had grown up in a third country.

Finally, an interview with a respondent of mixed parentage where neither parent was from Germany showed that decisive in her identity formation was the fact of being different from the Germans and the dominant influence of her South Asian mother. She consequently defined herself primarily as Pakistani, secondly as German and only thirdly as linked to the country of her father’s origin.

Interestingly the attitudes of the bi-national respondents did not differ drastically from those with two South Asian parents. Only a few who were born with German citizenship evaded grappling with the bi-culturality of their roots. Most avoided a clear
self-definition with the wish for dual nationality acting as symbol for this. Although all the respondents were rather light in their skin colour, most experienced external categorisation as other and thus felt different. Furthermore, most, with some interesting exceptions, had a rather functional interpretation of their German citizenship.

4.5. Conclusions

The interviews seem to indicate that second generation South Asians, whether of mixed parentage or not, will define themselves as something consisting of both parts, the South Asian and the German. Few are able and willing to use only one of the cultures as the basis for their self-definition. While Germany seems for almost all the home of present and future, the place they care most about and where they want things to be changed, South Asia remains in their consciousness as a symbol for their family roots and their otherness. Basically all respondents refer to othering experienced by ‘normal’ Germans on the basis of their skin colour. Given that citizenship plays an important role in German public discourse, it becomes of importance also for the second generation South Asians with basically all wishing for a symbolic dual nationality.

Interviews conducted with a few other respondents who are from mixed parentage but do not phenotypically differ from the majority population seem to confirm that external definition is of major importance in self-definition. While all had emotional links to the country of origin abroad, were happy about their dual nationalities and perceived themselves as different, it was far easier for them to define themselves as part of the majority population as long as they were not detected due to their names or behaviour as ‘other’.
Considering the interaction of law and society, the interviews discovered also some other interesting features. Although all argued that the German citizenship was of practical advantage, few really understood what this means. They were conscious in particular of the restriction to travelling which a South Asian passport brings along, most had also a vague idea that their legal status in Germany was more secure with German citizenship, but this was as much as most were aware of. Only few had thought in depth about political rights, security from being deported, protection when travelling abroad etc. Only a few individuals knew that a foreign citizenship could mean trouble when marrying or in related cases, nobody seemed aware that under international private law they were, as citizens of a South Asian country, still subject to parts of its laws. Furthermore, few were well informed about their actual legal status in Germany or the precise rules for naturalisation. This all means that although they were arguing with practical reasons, they did not really know what this meant, and a decision for or against naturalisation in general is informed by emotions and (potentially wrong) hearsay rather than being the consequence of a well-informed rational decision.

On top of this, most of the respondents displayed a high degree of inertia concerning the question of naturalisation. As their everyday life is not visibly shaped by their foreign passport, the need to change it does not appear apparent, especially to those still in school and living with their families. The occasional problem or increased trouble, such as applying for a visa, is annoying but not enough incentive to change anything. The older ones, however, who have experienced many troubles display a reaction of defiance and thus stick to their old passport. It thus needs an outside trigger for actually applying for naturalisation, either the parents deciding it or something special happening. Similarly although basically all would like to have dual nationality, almost
none made any effort in that direction. Those who changed citizenship or were born with the German passport did generally not make any inquiries to official institutions whether they were still eligible to the South Asian passport, they fully relied on second hand information.

Although there are many commonalities among the respondents, it also has to be emphasised that the individual histories are very diverse and that the individual reactions to specific situation are just as diverse. This can be seen most clearly in the reactions to external categorisation which include internalisation, struggle against it and defiance.
5. Conclusions

Despite all the differences in the laws, the migration history, the social status and the settlement patterns among South Asians in Britain and Germany one can find some similarities among the second generation. In particular they consider in both countries their place of residence their home where they want to remain, while at the same time looking to South Asia for the determinants of their identity. Much of the ambivalence in their lives is generated by external categorisation through parents and environment, which at the same time hinders and triggers the shaping of an own form of ethnicity and way of life. Due to the difference in laws the significance of citizenship for the second generation South Asians, however, differs drastically in both countries.

a) identity and categorisation

It has been repeatedly emphasised that categorisation by parents and the environment has a major impact on the self-definition of the second generation South Asians. Jenkins (1994 and 1996) describes these processes in detail and coins the term ‘transactional ethnicity’, which is never stable and always dependent on the interaction of the self and the other. He furthermore argues that socialisation necessarily always implies categorisation and thus for second generation migrants also an ethnic component (Jenkins 1997, 58-59 and 108). On the side of the parents this need not occur explicitly, although many do tell their children that they are South Asians and nothing else, but this will be transmitted much more subtly in the general up-bringing which is shaped by the parents’ own experience of migration, their feeling of being othered and their ability to cope with this situation. To analyse this further one needs to go into the extensive literature on migration and group formation. Interesting ideas on this can be found not only in the works of Jenkins, but also in Cohen (1997), Cohen (1985) and Rex (1995).
The migrants attempt to create a community of their own, which is defined via its difference to the majority rather than through internal homogeneity, i.e. it is aggregating more than integrating (Jenkins 1996, 108). The second generation members have to live with these creations of their parents, although they have not been tailored to their needs and the second generation has quite different perspectives on many matters. At the same time they have to face the civic, racial and cultural boundaries (Jacobson 1997) put in place by the society and state they are living in, among which the perceived racial difference is used as the basis for much othering. From this reality the second generation’s social and ethnic identity is constructed and thus becomes a reality in itself (see Jenkins 1996 and 1997, 73).

The difference between Britain and Germany is that in the latter country not only the racial but also the civic boundary is defined in exclusionary terms and thus also the realm of the civic is of major importance in external and internal definition. Citizenship develops into a symbol of belonging and much discussion and emotion revolves around it, even though as Britain displays, the abolition of this boundary is not sufficient to eliminate the feeling of being othered. It can thus only be a first step.

**b) identity and consciousness of being othered**

Citizenship can become a symbol only when it enters the consciousness of the person, thus it is of importance at what age a second generation South Asian acquires the passport of his or her country of residence. In Britain with the rules being based on *ius soli* almost everybody is born with British citizenship and most parents do not make any

---

21 On the differences between first and second generation see, for example, Waldinger and Perlmann (1998) and Zhou (1997).
endeavours to equip their children with the South Asian alternative. Accordingly, having a British passport is how things are, there is nothing to think about and nobody will question it as anything else would be less practical. Citizenship becomes a non-topic, the civic boundary is not there, there is no legal othering and thus other forms of othering are the issues of interest. One can see similar processes in Germany among those who got the German citizenship before they noticed this consciously. These second generation South Asians also do not think much about the issue, citizenship for most of them has no particular relevance in the sense of belonging. The struggle with the issue develops only among those who consciously had a non-German citizenship and experienced, at least to some extent, the official legal othering. As was already seen in the literature about second generation Turks, the state socialises in this case also the second generation South Asians as South Asians, alienates them from Germany and thus citizenship as a symbol arises. In order to integrate the young people into the state it would thus be best to introduce also in Germany the principle of *ius soli*. Alternatively the granting of a temporal dual nationality after naturalisation in contrast to the normal either/or decision would allow a gradual approach to being a German and would thus facilitate the eventual renunciation of the South Asian citizenship.

c) foreign citizenship as a refuge

Having a foreign citizenship means that it is far easier to distance oneself from the country one lives in than if one is its citizen. Accordingly the simplest reaction to othering is to fall back on the foreign identity and develop anti-host country sentiments. This became very clear in one of the interviews where only naturalisation made the respondent rethink her anti-German feelings and accept her own German socialisation and thus the German parts of herself. Flight, however, in most cases means that one
seeks the role of the victim and stays in passivity. This is the easier option than fighting for one’s own rights, but in the long run might be a hindrance to the formation of a positive self-definition and interaction with others. The possibility of fleeing from the national identity is probably of more significance in Germany than in Britain as also many ‘normal’ Germans would like to flee from their country’s past and have many problems in defining themselves as Germans, i.e. in accepting to be part of the historical aggressors rather than the victims. It appears from several of the responses that this is one further reason, why some Indo-Germans of mixed parentage emphasised their non-German origin so much. It gave them the legitimacy to belong to the oppressed rather than the oppressors and thus excluded them from the collective guilt. This was, however, not a general sentiment among the respondents, some argued that their South Asian origins made it much less necessary for them to distance themselves from Germany as they were linked to the country today rather than that of 60 years ago.

\[d) \textit{foreign citizenship and increased ignorance of law}\]

General ignorance of the details of law is a normal feature, people act not on the basis of a knowledge of statutes but rather on what everybody says is the law. This will not be quite accurate but is normally sufficient to be protected from major surprises. For ethnic minorities the situation is somewhat different, since migrants bring their own notions of law with them, informed through the legal system of their countries of origin (see Pearl 1972, 120). As can be seen in Britain this can lead to some surprises and problems, especially in matters of family law. For the second generation, however, the situation is somewhat different, they are primarily informed about the laws by the general notions in their country of residence. Thus they would be well informed if the same laws applied to them as to the other residents, as is the case in Britain. In Germany, however,
those without German citizenship are misguided in this assumption since for them the legal rules are quite different. Accordingly, for example, many respondents mentioned that when school trips were planned they regularly forgot that they had to apply for visas and thus endangered their participation. Little thought is put by the second generation foreigners, furthermore, into such matters as eligibility for scholarships, rules relating to studying abroad or access to particular professions. Most young people just forget that for them the regulations might be different than those for their German friends. Even less do they worry about issues such as marriage, inheritance, etc. They are thus likely to be continually surprised by legal restrictions they encounter and will not only face troubles but also often barriers, which could only have been removed with foresight. Second generation foreigners in Germany, accordingly, face an increased ignorance of law and its consequences.

e) state and residents

Second generation South Asians both in Britain and Germany are there to stay. Britain accepts this and thus gives them the rights of a citizen, even if great parts of the society and establishment still other and exclude them. Germany, however, still sticks to the myth of the ethnically homogenous nation where others are only guests and will go after some time. Citizenship is thus not used as a means to integrate, in fact it functions as an exclusionary force, with the effect of refusing a not unimportant part of the population civic rights and thus sending its members signals to withdraw from the state, its institutions and the shaping of its polity. This, however, cannot be in the interest of any state as it restricts its control over the population and, instead of integrating, creates an antagonised group within its territorial boundaries.
All this shows that due to the differentiation between Germans and foreigners in Germany, citizenship develops a symbolic character of belonging not only to a state but also to a society.\textsuperscript{22} This results in resistance against renouncing the South Asian citizenship, the importance of having the German citizenship before one can identify with that country and the wish for dual nationality.

In the time of globalisation and the consequent development of trans-national identities (see Cohen 1997, 157) it is, in any case, questionable whether an ethnically or nationally defined citizenship is still adequate. Although the continuance of this concept would cater for the increased need for symbols in a time where many traditional ones are vanishing (Cohen 1997, 169 and Jenkins 1996, 109), it falls short of being able to deal with new realities. A change towards a more functional concept of citizenship linked to residence rather than ancestry or culture can cope with those much better (see also Spencer 1995). Currently much research is done on this topic\textsuperscript{23}, which revolves in Germany around the idea of Verfassungspatriotismus, i.e. constitutional patriotism. A discussion of that topic must, however, be left to another study.

\textsuperscript{22} For the importance of symbolic communities see Cohen (1985) and Gans (1996).

\textsuperscript{23} See, for example, Bauböck (1991), Habermas (1991) and Breton (1996) on the ideas of a civic nation.
Bibliography


Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für die Belange der Ausländer (1992), Jugend ohne deutschen Paß, Bonn.


Brubaker, Rogers (1996), „Civic and ethnic nations in France and Germany“, in: New Community, 23(2), 157-172.


Desai, Elisabeth (1993), Hindus in Deutschland, Documentation 1993 Hindus in Europe/ Germany, Moeers.


Dummett, Ann and Andrew Nicol (1990), Subjects, citizens, aliens and others - nationality and immigration Law, London.


Fransman, Laurie (1989), Fransman’s British nationality law, London.


Habermas, Jürgen (1991), Staatsbürgerschaft und nationale Identität, St. Gallen.

Hutchinson, John and Anthony D. Smith (eds.) (1996), Ethnicity, Oxford.


Pearl, David (1972), „Muslim marriages in English law“, in: Cambridge Law Journal, 120-143.


Schmalz-Jacobson, Cornelia and Georg Hansen (eds.) (1997), Kleines Lexikon der ethnischen Minderheiten in Deutschland, München.


